Risk and Asian exchange rate regimes by Goyal, Ashima & Agarwal, Ankita
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Risk and Asian exchange rate regimes
Ashima Goyal and Ankita Agarwal
Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Resaerch
September 2005
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/24309/
MPRA Paper No. 24309, posted 11. August 2010 00:58 UTC
Preprint from Global Economic Review, Vol. 34, No. 3, 321-329, September 2005. 
Risk and Asian Exchange Rate Regimes 








Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research 
Gen. Vaidya Marg, Santosh Nagar, 
Goregaon (E), Mumbai-400 065 
ashima @ igidr.ac.in 
Tel.: +91-22-28400920 (EPABX), Fax: +91-22-28402752  
http://www.igidr.ac.in/~ashima 
 
and *Visiting Fulbright Senior Research Fellow 
Claremont Graduate University 
Tel: +01 909 621 8689 
 
 
Acknowledgement: Ashima Goyal thanks Fulbright, and Claremont Graduate University for 
providing a congenial working environment, Thomas Willett for comments, and Sven Arndt, 
Benjamin Cohen, and Randall Hennings for useful discussions on this topic and Saumik Paul for 
research assistance. Useful feedback was received after presenting some of the ideas at the 
Claremont Colleges. 
Abstract 
A panel regression gives evidence that more flexibility in Asian exchange rates reduces risk 
associated with bank borrowing abroad, but deviations from mean exchange rates, and from the 
renminbi, increase risk. Since the exchange rate regime affects bank behavior and the incentives to 
hedge, the results broadly support the bank run over the moral hazard view of twin banking and 
currency crisis. The results suggest that flexibility in exchange rates is required for Asian EMEs, but 
the flexibility has to be limited, and it depends on more flexibility in the renminbi. This has 
implications for current global imbalances in reserves and feasible adjustment paths. 
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1.Introduction 
East Asian had a twin crisis in the late nineties, a combined currency and banking crisis.  We 
examine the analytical links between the two, in particular the effect of the exchange rate regime on 
the risky behavior of banks, and their willingness to hedge currency risk. 
 
In order to examine the effect of exchange rate flexibility in reducing risk for banks, we regress, for 
eleven Asian EMEs, the growth of net foreign assets of the banking sector on the mean deviations 
and on the squared mean deviation, of each country’s exchange rate, including macroeconomic 
control variables. The regressions are repeated for deviations from the renminbi, normalized by the 
mean. The cross county panel results show that a fixed exchange rate increases risk for Asian EMEs, 
and this risk rises with the distance from the renminbi.  
 
Since the exchange rate regime affects risk-taking of banks, the results support the bank run view of 
the East Asian crisis (Velasco and Chang, 1999) over the broader moral hazard view (Corsetti, 
Pesenti and Roubini 1999). If exchange rates had not been largely fixed prior to the crisis banks 
would have undertaken less foreign liabilities, hedged currency risk more, and runs on banks, which 
turns illiquid banks insolvent, would not have occurred.    
 
The implication is that a move to greater flexibility would lower currency risk for these countries, 
including for China. Although explicit monetary cooperation may be far in the future, our results 
suggest that there already is an implicit alignment among Asian exchange rates. Since the Chinese 
exchange rate plays a key role, more flexibility in the renminbi will make possible more flexibility in 
all Asian exchange rates.  
 
After a brief comparison in section 2, of structure, macroeconomic policy and trade patterns across 
Asian EMEs, regressions are presented in section 3. The link between real wages and exchange rates 
and its implications for adjustment are explored in section 4. Section 5 draws out implications of the 





2. Exchange rates and risk 
Exchange rate regimes immediately affect the currency risk, or the risk of an unexpected change in 
the value of a currency. But currency risk can aggravate systemic, liquidity and credit risk. Therefore 
monetary and exchange rate policy has a role in developing markets, strengthening institutions, and 
moderating risk.  
 
The East Asian currency crises have been called third generation or capital account crises. Unlike 
earlier crises, in which fiscal weakness played a major role, East Asian governments had low budget 
deficits and low public debt. Inflation was in single digits, economic growth was high and so were 
saving and investment ratios. Some external shocks in 1996, involving a fall in export demand, 
triggered a large capital outflow and currency depreciation in 1997. Banks had large foreign 
currency denominated unhedged debt. As currencies depreciated, the domestic currency value of the 
debt rose, and doubt about the credit worthiness of balance sheets of firms and banks escalated into 
twin currency and banking crises. Since gearing or the ratio of bank loans to equity is high in these 
economies, they are particularly sensitive to sharp changes in interest and exchange rates. 
 
Many firms in EMEs borrow abroad in dollars but produce for the domestic market. Depreciation 
hurts the profitability and financial position of these borrowers, especially if they are unhedged, and 
may lead to a run on the banking system. A fall in credit leads to a fall in output, while a fall in 
money demand leads to further depreciation, culminating in the twin crisis. 
 
Twin crises have been frequent in the post Bretton Woods period, and normally whenever they have 
occurred banks, have had a currency mismatch between their assets and liabilities, and they have not 
completely hedged the associated currency risk.  
 
There are two views. One (for example, Corsetti, Pesenti and Roubini 1999) says that it was a 
financial not a currency crisis. Implicit and explicit government guarantees had created moral 
hazard, which encouraged overborrowing abroad and generated unhedged short-term liabilities. 
Foreign creditors were willing to lend to domestic agents against expected bailouts from the 
government. There were fundamental problems in the banks, which were inherently insolvent. The 
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second (Chang and Velasco, 1999) argues that bank runs1 turn illiquidity into insolvency. The health 
of balance sheets after a run is misleading, since runs also occur on solvent banks. Self-fulfilling 
panics and herd behavior makes these problems worse. If illiquidity is the problem, a lender of last 
resort, or the availability of liquidity on tap, can restore market confidence.  
 
But fixed exchange rate regimes themselves create moral hazard, and increases banks’ risk-taking. 
They are an implicit guarantee, create moral hazard, and generate overborrowing without hedging. 
To the extent fixed exchange regimes induced overborrowing the broader moral hazard view looses 
weight. The bank run view implies that a flexible exchange rate regime can actually reduce the 
possibility of a bank run. Since it is known a bank will not become insolvent, the incentive to run on 
a bank turning illiquidity into insolvency is removed. We examine this argument in more detail 
below.  
 
2.1 Bank runs and the exchange rate regime 
Consider a simple version of the Chang and Velasco (1999) model of foreign borrowing 
intermediated through banks. They show that run equilibria are possible with fix exchange rates, but 
not with flexible. 
 
Consider a small open economy with three periods, a planning, a short and a long run. There is a 
single perishable freely traded consumer good in each period. The economy is dollarized with 
foreign prices normalized to a unit dollar. 
 
Ex-ante identical depositors have a fixed endowment a in the first period. Each maximizes two-
period consumption and can lend an infinite amount but borrow a fixed amount f from identical risk 
free foreign creditors. Each lends, investing in a liquid asset b and a long-term asset k. There is a 
probability λ of a shock, equal to the proportion of the unlucky population. A capital infusion of i < 
a+f allows a return Rk to be earned in period 2, where R (1-λ) > 1. If the infusion is not available so 
that k has to be liquidated the return earned is rk, r <1. The long-term asset is more profitable but is 
illiquid in the short-run. If the excess returns from holding the long-term assets to maturity exceed 
the opportunity cost of holding liquid assets, it will be optimal for consumption maximizing 
                                                 
1 Their model is based on Diamond and Dybvig’s (1983) early modeling of rational bank runs. 
 4
individuals to hold sufficient b to finance i. Since R>1, b will not exceed i; there is an opportunity 
cost of giving up R. 
 
But consumers can do better if only the unlucky proportion λ of the population hold the liquid asset 
to finance i and others can invest in the long-run asset. Banks make this possible through the law of 
large numbers, pooling resources and maximizing consumption of the representative member.  Now 
b*= λi, less than i, and therefore consumption is higher. 
 
An optimal allocation (c*, b*, k*) can be implemented through a demand deposit system. Given 
resources a +f in period 0, banks invest b* and k*, in order to maximize consumption, c, subject to k 
+ b ≤ w, where w is wealth. In period 1, banks liquidate b* or b*+ rk*, to serve unlucky depositors 
on a first come first served basis, and in period 2, c* = R(w - λi) – f is paid out, with depositors that 
did not withdraw in period 1 being served first. The incentive constraint c* ≤ i is satisfied by 
assumption since i ≤ (Rw – f) /(1 + λk). This ensures that lying about shocks, liquidating in period 1, 
and absconding is not profitable for lucky depositors, who do not receive a shock in period 1. 
 
Since holding liquidity is costly the bank may choose to become illiquid in the short run, that is: 
b* + rk* < i . This condition is necessary and sufficient for a bank run equilibrium to occur. If  λr > 
λ depositors decide to withdraw in a run, the bank is forced to liquidate all assets and close. 
Therefore those who do not run will not be paid anything in period 2, so it is individually optimal for 
each of them to run on the bank. 
 
Under dollarization, which is an extreme fix exchange rate regime we have seen that both an honest 
and a run equilibrium hold. 
 
Now consider a fixed exchange rate regime with a lender of last resort (LOLR), the local central 
bank (CB). In this case the bank remains solvent but a currency crisis can occur.  The CB gives a 
credit line to the commercial bank in return for the right to the banks assets. As depositors withdraw 
i in random order from the bank, it liquidates b*, then borrows from the CB. The depositors buy 
foreign currency (dollars) with local currency b* from the CB. The CB sells dollars first with the b* 
dollars bought from the commercial bank in order to maintain the fixed exchange rate and then by 
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liquidating rk*. If b* + rK* < i it can run out of dollars and shut its windows implying a currency 
crisis. 
 
Under a flexible exchange rate with a LOLR, the demand and supply for dollars can be equated by 
auction at the CB. The demand for dollars from depositors in a bank run will be λr i and the supply 
of dollars from the CB will be λi. Equating the two, where E is the flexible exchange rate: 
 
λri = EλI 
 
 or  
 
E = λr/λ 
 
In a run equilibrium where λr > λ the exchange rate depreciates. Now a run equilibrium cannot occur 
since a lucky depositor withdrawing i will be able to consume only i/E < i, the bank does not need to 
liquidate k early and will be able to pay c* to each 1 - λr depositors that do not run. Therefore it is 
not optimal for lucky depositors to participate in a run. 
 
Thus flexible exchange rates reduce risk for banks by reducing the possibility of a run equilibrium 
where illiquidity can turn into insolvency.  
 
2.2 Hedging 
Flexible exchange rates also increase incentives to hedge, for both banks and their customers. Apart 
from informal ways of hedging risk it is possible to buy forward cover in the market. With two-way 
movement both importers and exporters have an incentive to reduce currency exposure. Hedging 
removes the effect of currency movement in any one direction on profits by creating exposure in the 
opposite direction2. Thin markets raise the cost of formal hedging, and a high interest differential 
                                                 
2
During a period of steady depreciation of the Indian rupee over 1996-2002 only importers used to buy forward cover. 
Over 2003 as the rupee appreciated only exporters were hedging. Importers also rushed for cover when the rupee started 
depreciating in May 2004. There were news reports that major software firms such as Infosys and Wipro would not be 
able to gain from the depreciation because of the forward cover they had taken. The point is precisely that with hedging 
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raises the cost of informal hedging. If an importer holds a dollar deposit as an informal hedge he 
sacrifices domestic high interest. If he has to borrow in domestic currency he pays an additional 
higher interest rate at home. Similar considerations affect banks acting on behalf of retail trade. 
Banks will not hedge currency risk if exchange rates are fixed, but unless open exposure is strictly 
limited banks would arbitrage: take dollar deposits and make high interest domestic loans. If zero or 
low exposure is enforced, banks contribution to developing the forex market and discovering the 
value of the currency is limited. There creating incentives for hedging is better than quantitative 
restrictions on currency exposure. 
 
Limited exchange rate volatility is easier to hedge than interest rate volatility. It makes it easier for 
monetary authorities to smooth interest rates, since the need for the interest rate defense is reduced. 
Interest volatility has a deeper impact particularly when bank loans are the dominant mode of 
finance as they are in Asian EMEs, where the reliance on bank debt is high. A rise in interest rates 
delivers a severe shock to the financial system. Moreover Jeanne (2003) argues that if firms choose 
the currency composition of their debts in order to minimize their probability of default, they will 
dollarize liabilities and reduce hedging precisely when the risk of a large devaluation increases. The 
reason is that domestic interest rates also rise in such conditions making domestic borrowing and 
hedging both costlier. 
 
There is the original sin argument that EME banks have limits to borrowing in domestic currency. 
They must borrow in foreign currency and cannot hedge currency risk (Eichengreen and Hausman, 
2000). But Burnside, Eichenbaum and Rebelo (2001) collect evidence that markets, instruments and 
opportunities existed for hedging in East Asian countries prior to the crisis, although there were 
some restrictions on the use of currency derivatives, for example in Korea. These markets certainly 
existed in a country like Sweden, which also had a twin crisis in the early nineties. The failure was 
more of incentives to hedge. They also present both BIS and IFS evidence for Asian and European 
countries that before a twin crisis both banks and firms held large net foreign liabilities. Even if 
banks hedge their own foreign exchange exposure, they are exposed to large indirect credit risk, 
from their client firms who have borrowed in foreign currency. 
                                                                                                                                                                   
they can stop worrying about the impact of the rupee on their profits, and trying to make money from rupee movements. 
Instead they can focus on their key activity, producing better software.  
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Thus flexible exchange rates should also decrease risk for banks by creating incentives for them and 
their customers to reduce currency exposure, thus lowering the effect of exchange rate volatility on 
balance sheets and its cumulative impact.  
 
3. Empirical tests 
After the East Asian currency crisis many Asian countries have moved towards more flexible 
exchange rate regimes. But the Chinese renminbi has been fixed to the dollar since 1994. Therefore 
we estimate the impact of this structure of exchange rates on banks creation of risk through foreign 
borrowing. In order to capture the effect of both exchange rate deviations and fluctuations on 
changes in banks net foreign assets, we regress, for eleven Asian EMEs, the growth of net foreign 
assets of the banking sector on the mean deviations and on the squared mean deviation, of each 
country’s exchange rate, including macroeconomic control variables. Since economic and banks’ 
activity and foreign interest differentials affect banks net foreign assets these variables are included 
as controls. The regressions are repeated for deviations from the renminbi, normalized by the mean. 
Significant coefficients would imply that the exchange rate regime affects banks net foreign assets, 
and the signs would indicate the structure of the effect. The coefficients would also help to 
distinguish between the moral hazard and bank run hypotheses. 
 
Significant exchange rate variables would support the bank run over the extended moral hazard 
school explanation for twin crises. To the extent that the fixed exchange rate was responsible for 
perverse incentives that created unhedged currency mismatch, the role played by other types of 
moral hazard is reduced. For example, Burnside, Eichenbaum and Rebelo (2001) argue that broader 
government guarantees to banks’ foreign creditors, such as full repayment in the event of a default, 
eliminate banks’ incentives to hedge the risk of devaluation. Since hedging profits from forward 
contracts are realized if there is devaluation, but these go to the government in the event of a 
devaluation-induced bankruptcy, banks do not want to hedge.  If in the post-crisis period during 
which the estimation is undertaken, flexible exchange rates increase banks net foreign assets, and 
thus reduce unhedged liabilities, while other government guarantees continue, their argument does 
not find support; just a different exchange rate regime creates incentives for banks to reduce 
currency mismatch.  
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 If flexible exchange rates reduce the probability of a sharp devaluation, and a devaluation induced 
bankruptcy, according to the bank run model, they will increase banks incentives to hedge. This, and 
more hedging by their clients will further reduce risk for banks. 
 
The coefficients for mean deviations would give the affect of deviations from the mean on risky 
behavior of banks. Since the renminbi remains fixed to the dollar, this will also have implications for 
the level and alignment of Asian exchange rates and potential adjustment paths in response to the 
global imbalances in reserve accumulation and current account deficits.    
 
3.1Data and methodology 
The dependent variable, GY, is growth rate of net foreign assets of the banking sector. The 
independent variables are X1, deviation of the exchange rate from the mean divided by the mean, 
X2, square of X1 used as a proxy for variance of exchange rate, X3, deviation of domestic exchange 
rate from Chinese exchange rate (both normalized by the respective means), and X4, the square of 
X3. The exchange rate is measured as national currency per US $. Control variables used are, the 
growth rate of the Index of Industrial Production (IIP), growth in bank credit (GBC), and deviation 
of the domestic deposit interest rate from the US deposit rate (II). The sum of money and quasi 
money is used as a proxy for bank credit. 
 
The monthly data points extend over 1998-1 to 2002-12. They exceed 400. Countries included are 
China, India, Indonesia, S. Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, and Turkey. Table 5 gives the 
summary statistics of the variables.  
 
The data is largely sourced from the IFS CDNET. Data for the dependent variable has been collected from 
central bank websites except for China and Korea. For Turkey, Korea and Indonesia, the data was in billions 
of national currency which was converted into US$ millions. 
 
3.2Results 
The coefficients of the exchange rate variables are all significant at 1 per cent in the fixed effects 
regression (Tables 7 and 8). The deviations from the mean or the level variables X1 and X3 have 
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negative signs and the squared deviations capturing fluctuations in the exchange rates, X2 and X4, 
have positive signs. Growth of the net foreign assets falls with the distance of the exchange rate from 
its mean value but rises with flexibility in the exchange rates3. Except for IIP, which is less directly 
relevant to a bank’s decision, the other two control variables are significant. 
 
The results imply that limited exchange rate flexibility increases banks net foreign assets and thus 
lowers risk. It reduces the risk of associated with currency mismatch and may also be encouraging 
hedging.  In addition to flexibility of exchange rates itself encouraging hedging, reduction in the risk 
of sharp devaluation and smoother interest rates also improve incentives for hedging. 
 
Since the exchange rate regime affects bank behavior the regressions support the bank run, rather 
than the moral hazard explanation of the East Asian crisis. The fixed exchange rate regimes that 
prevailed during that period probably increased banks acquisition of net foreign liabilities and 
reduced their incentives to hedge.  
 
But risk associated with net foreign liabilities and currency mismatch rises as the distance between 
the exchange rates of Asian EMEs from their own mean values and from the Chinese exchange rate 
rises. This implies first, that movements in exchange rates have to be limited, or managed, in order 
to prevent a large deviation of levels, which raises risk.  Second, that unless China moves its peg, a 
major change in the level of Asian exchange rates will raise risk. Banks net foreign liabilities 
increase as their country’s exchange rate deviates far from its mean value or from the renminbi, but 
limited exchange rate flexibility lowers such risky behavior.  
 
The regressions suggest that reducing financial risk requires flexible exchange rates. But the 
movement has to be limited suggesting an implicit alignment of Asian exchange rates. These results 
also have implications for the imbalances that have built up across countries and regions in foreign 
exchange reserves. The US has a large current account and fiscal deficit and many Asian EMEs have 
a surplus in their balance of payments and capital inflows. They are accumulating substantial 
reserves in order to prevent their currencies from appreciating. 
                                                 
3 In these regressions X3 and X4 for China reflect its link to the dollar. If the Chinese exchange rate is considered as 
fixed to its own mean, which makes X3 and X4 equal zero for China, the coefficients are still significant, and the signs 
remain unchanged, but their size falls.   
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 Dollar depreciation will be more effective in reducing US deficits if the Chinese currency 
appreciates somewhat against the dollar. Although many Asian currencies have been appreciating, 
our regressions suggest that appreciation would be less risky if the Chinese currency also 
appreciates, so that Asian currencies are able to retain risk-minimizing alignments with the renminbi. 
 
Limited flexibility of the renminbi coming, for example, from a change to a multiple-currency peg 
would actually reduce risk and instability in Asia and enhance the degree of flexibility of Asian 
currencies. This would encourage the development of forex and financial markets, which is a major 
objective for China and other countries in the region. Since these countries have thin financial 
markets, but are keen to deepen them, managed floating or limited exchange rate flexibility would 
further this purpose.  
 
The regressions also imply that the currencies would appreciate along with the renminbi to maintain 
optimal alignments so that China would not loose competitive advantage in Asia. To the extent 
Asian EMEs are trade competitors this makes adjustment easier.  But other non-competitive types of 
intra-Asian trade are large and growing, so that effects on competition should not be the major 
consideration. 
 
Adjustment of Asian real exchange rate levels is also limited by potential adjustment in real wages in 
some of the labor-intensive economies of Asia. This topic is explored in Goyal (2005).  
 
6.Conclusion 
A panel regression gives evidence that more flexibility in Asian exchange rates reduces risk 
associated with bank borrowing abroad, but deviations from mean exchange rates, and from the 
renminbi, increase risk. Since the exchange rate regime affects bank behavior and the incentives to 
hedge, the results broadly support the bank run over the moral hazard view of twin banking and 
currency crisis. The results suggest that Asian EMEs should move to more flexibility in exchange 
rates, but the flexibility will have to be limited, and it depends on more flexibility in the renminbi. 
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Table 1: Summary statistics for the regressions 
Variable Observation Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Exchange rate 480 103573.3 323576.7 1.58 1685920 
GY 406 .0662797 2.745253  -28.9269   41.04155 
GIIP1 418 .0431803   .5460506  -.8548387  7.571429 
GBC 462 .0146866   .0281009  -.0725257  .2713284 
II 420 11.18014   23.16401  -5.01      115.37 
X1 480 -9.68e-11 .2302291  -.7375563  1.060777 
X2 480 .0531211   .1635352  0 1.125247 
X3 480 .1083333   .6367681  -1.177167 1.08759 




Table 2: Exchange rate: level and volatility effects 
GY COEF STD ERROR T P>|t| 95% Conf interval 
X1 -.7466172 .1977538 -3.78 0.000 -1.135777   -.357457 
X2 1.270968 .3905886 3.25 .001 .502328         2.039609 
GIIP -.0112455 .0895944 -.13 .900 -.1875586     .1650676 
GBC -3.340085 1.792995 -1.86 .063 -6.868526      .1883551 




Table 3: Deviations from renminbi 
          
GY   
COEF. STD. ERR. T P>|T| [95% CONF. INTERVAL] 
          
X3   
-.5437506 .1763097 -3.08 0.002 -.8907109   -.1967902 
          
X4   
.7546954 .3141732 2.40 0.017 .1364331    1.372958 
       
GIIP  
-.0109269 .0903104 -0.12 0.904 -.1886489    .1667951 
         
GBC   
-3.218941 1.807701 -1.78 0.076 -6.776321     .338439 
          
II   
-.0077217 .0052738 -1.46 0.144 -.0181    .0026567 
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